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RECENT CASE
THE ACCEPTANCE OF BRAIN DEATH AS A LEGAL
DEFINITION OF DEATH IN ILLINOIS:
IN RE HA YMER
Prior to the development of modern medical technology, it was well settled
that death occurred when respiration and circulation ceased.' Without ar-
tificial life support systems, the brain died within a few minutes of the cessa-
tion of breathing and circulation.2 Accordingly, such a determination of death
was sufficiently accurate. 3  Since the late 1960's, however, organ
transplantation,' cardiopulmonary resuscitation,' and mechanical respiratory
maintenance6 have become commonplace. As a consequence of these medical
developments, the definition of death as cessation of respiration and cir-
1. The fourth edition of Black's Law Dictionary contains the most frequently cited defini-
tion of death: "The cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians as a total
stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions
consequent thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (4th
ed. 1968). Eleven years later, the fifth edition made reference to brain death as an alternative
definition of death: "The cessation of life; permanent cessations of all vital functions and signs.
Numerous states have enacted statutory definitions of death which include brain-related criteria."
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 360 (5th ed. 1979); see also Estate of Schmidt, 261 Cal. App. 2d
262, 273, 67 Cal. Rptr. 847, 854 (1968) (for purposes of the decision, death was defined as
total stoppage of the circulation of the blood and cessation of vital functions, as defined in
the third edition of Black's Law Dictionary); Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.2d 496, 497 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1952) (a body is not dead so long as there is a heartbeat). See generally Comment, Medical
and Legal Views of Death: Confrontation and Reconciliation, 19 ST. Louis U.L.J. 172 (1974)
(cessation of respiration and circulation were unimpeachable indicators of death prior to
technological and scientific developments) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Medical and Legal
Views].
2. Hirsh, Brain Death, 21 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 377, 378 (1975). Respiratory failure and
circulatory impairment result in anoxia of the brain. Unless resuscitative measures are instituted
immediately, total and irreversible cessation of brain function occurs. Id.
3. Id.
4. On December 4, 1967, Dr. Christiaan Barnard transplanted the heart of one man into
the body of another who was dying of advanced cardiac disease. Note, The Time of Death-A
Legal, Ethical, and Medical Dilemma, 18 CATH. LAW. 243, 243 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Note, The Time of Death]. When the heart and lungs are stopped so that a defective heart
can be replaced by a healthy one, the recipient is placed on a cardiopulmonary bypass machine
which provides the necessary circulation and oxygenation. See Comment, Medical and Legal
Views, supra note 1, at 172 (strides in medical science, such as the heart-lung machine, increase
the uncertainty in the determination of death).
5. At Johns Hopkins Hospital in 1960, Dr. Kouwenhoven and his associates devised a
procedure to restore and sustain the circulation. The procedure, known as cardiopulmonary
resuscitation, involves rhythmic compression of the lower sternum to compress the heart and
mouth-to-mouth ventilation to supply oxygen. L. MELTZER, R. PINNEO & J. KITCHELL, INTEN-
stvE CORONARY CARE 30 (4th ed. 1983).
6. A respirator is a machine for prolonged artificial respiration. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC
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culation has become increasingly difficult to apply. 7 Technological
developments can now restore life as defined by the traditional criteria even
when there has been massive brain damage that precludes any possibility
of a person returning to consciousness.'
The difficulty these technological developments have created in diagnos-
ing death, combined with medical advancements in the study of brain activity,
has prompted the medical community to develop an alternative definition
of death-brain death.' Unfortunately, the legal community has lagged behind
the medical community in the acceptance of brain death as a determinant
of death. Thus, a person void of any cerebral function may be considered
medically dead, but legally alive.'"
Recently, in an effort to resolve this definitional dilemma, the Illinois
Appellate Court for the First District accepted brain death as a legal defini-
tion of death in In re Haymer." Although this decision is binding precedent
only within the First District, it nonetheless will be highly persuasive in other
Illinois courts." The following discussion will examine the present state of
the law regarding brain death in other jurisdictions in an effort to deter-
mine the future implications of Haymer. This discussion will focus on the
debate over whether the legislature or the judiciary is the preferable forum
for action on this issue. Close analysis of the concept of brain death in-
dicates that although the Haymer decision was appropriate, legislative action
should be taken by the General Assembly to make brain death a legal defini-
tion of death state-wide.
BACKGROUND
Medical
A thorough analysis of the Haymer decision and the subject of brain death
must begin with an understanding of the basic physiology of the brain and
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1241 (14th ed. 1981); see Comment, Medical and Legal Views, supra
note 1, at 172 (mechanical respirators have given physicians the power to maintain a patient's
breathing artificially and thereby preserve one of the previously cardinal signs of life).
7. The ability of an organ recipient to continue living after his heart has been removed
and replaced by another has greatly undermined the status of the beating heart as the primary
sign that a person is alive. Capron & Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Deter-
mining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 87, 89 (1972).
8. A Definition of Irreversible Coma: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard
Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, 205 J. A.M.A. 337, 339 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as A Definition of Irreversible Coma].
9. Id. at 337. A brain that no longer functions and has no possibility of ever functioning
again is, for all practical purposes, dead. The characteristics of a permanently nonfunctioning
brain include (1) unreceptivity and unresponsitivity; (2) no movement or breathing; (3) no reflexes;
and (4) a flat electroencephalogram. These characteristics are commonly referred to as the Har-
vard criteria for brain death. Id. at 337-38. For a more detailed description of the criteria,
see infra note 81.
10. Jacobson, Anderson & Speigel, Towards a Statutory Definition of Death in Illinois,
14 J. MAR. L. REV. 701, 701 (1981).
11. 115 11. App. 3d 349, 450 N.E.2d 940 (1st Dist. 1983).
12. There are very few cases nationwide that seek to define death. Haymer is a case of
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the process of dying. The brain is divided into several sections. The cerebral
cortex is the site of the highest centers of the brain, those having to do
with intelligence, perceptions, memory, cognition and consciousness. 3 The
cerebellum is the next section of the brain which is of significance, and its
primary function lies in control of body equilibrium."' The brain stem is
the lowest portion of the brain and it controls the vital functions such as
respiration, heart rate, and blood pressure, as well as other biological
functions. '
Dying, long thought to be a single event,' is now understood to be a
continuous process with an orderly progression from clinical death, to brain
death, to biological death, to cellular death." The initial stage of clinical
death occurs when respiration and circulation cease. When circulation ceases,
the brain is deprived of oxygen and anoxia occurs. At this point brain death
is inevitable and follows within minutes unless resuscitative procedures are
instituted immediately. "8
The brain also dies in an orderly progression. First the cerebral cortex
ceases to function, followed by the cerebellum, and finally the brain stem
or vital centers. When all parts of the brain are dead, biological death, or
permanent extinction of bodily life, occurs.' 9 It is at this point that cellular
death begins.2" Because cellular death is the last step in the process, organs
first impression in Illinois. Consequently, any future case within the state that requires a legal
determination of death will look to the Haymer decision as persuasive authority.
13. See A. GUYTON, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL PHYSIOLOGY 564, 687, 690-94 (6th ed. 1981).
14. Id. at 662-65.
15. Id. at 516, 563, 701-02.
1.6. See, e.g., Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App. 2d 371, 376, 215 P.2d 478, 482 (1950)
(court used this concept to assist in defining death). See generally Morison, Death: Process
or Event?, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYING 57 (R. Weir ed. 1977) (traditional view
of death as clearly defined event that puts an end to life is deeply imbedded in literature,
art, and law).
17. Hirsh, supra note 2, at 378.
18. Id.; see also LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, CRITERIA FOR THE DETERMINATION
OF DEATH 13 (1979) [hereinafter cited as CRITERIA FOR THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH]. Loss
of blood circulation to the brain results in loss of consciousness within ten seconds. Resuscita-
tion within four minutes will prevent any critical brain damage to the patient. Necrosis of
the cerebral cortex occurs within eight to ten minutes. The damage within this period of time
is such that it may be impossible for the patient ever to regain consciousness, with resulting
loss of all manifestations of personality. Within 15 to 18 minutes, the brain stem begins to
die. Such destruction results in loss of vital functions such as circulation and respiration unless
supportive measures are undertaken.
Often the distinction between brain death and irreversible coma is confused. Brain death
refers to the total destruction of the brain including all brain stem activity. See An Appraisal
of the Criteria of Cerebral Death, 237 J. A.M.A. 982 (1977). Irreversible coma, however, is
a persistent vegetative state in which a person loses all cortical functions but retains lower
brain functions. Thus, the person will never regain consciousness, but the entire brain is not
destroyed. The person is still very much alive. See also In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 26, 355
A.2d 647, 654 (1976) (Karen Ann Quinlan is an example of a person in a persistent vegetative
state).
19. Hirsh, supra note 2, at 379.
20. Id.
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such as the heart and kidneys can be transplanted after biological death has
occurred.2
Legal
Brain Death
Prior to the Illinois appellate court's recognition in Haymer, brain death
had been accepted as a legal definition in at least thirty-five other states.22
Twenty-nine states had done so through legislative action23 and six through
judicial decision.2" The legal acceptance of brain death is relatively re-
21. See, e.g., CRITERIA FOR THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH, supra note 18, at 13. The length
of time before cellular death begins varies from organ to organ. Heart tissue can survive anoxia
for one hour to 90 minutes, kidneys can survive for two and a half hours, lungs for 30 to
60 minutes, and liver for 15 to 30 minutes.
22. 115 Ill. App. 3d at 352, 450 N.E.2d at 943. The Haymer court stated that at least
34 states had legally recognized brain death. That number, however, was actually 35, but the
Haymer court inadvertently excluded the state of Washington, which judicially recognized brain
death in In re Welfare of Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407, 617 P.2d 731 (1980). For a list of the
states that have recognized brain death, see infra notes 23-24.
23. See ALA. CODE § 22-31-1 (Supp. 1982); ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.120 (Supp. 1982); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 82-537 (Supp. 1983); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1780 (West Supp. 1983);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-136 (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 382.085 (West Supp. 1983);
GA. CODE ANN. § 88-1716 (Supp. 1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 327C-1 (Supp. 1982); IDAHO
CODE § 54-1819 (Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 702.8 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 77-202 (Supp. 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (West Supp. 1983); MD. HEALTH GEN.
CODE ANN. § 5-203 (1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.1021 (West 1980); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 41-36-3 (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-22-101 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 451.007
(1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-323 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2108.30 (Page 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-301 (West 1981); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 146.001 (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-459 (1980); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447t
(Vernon Supp. 1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5218 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 54-325.7 (1982);
W. VA. CODE § 16-10-2 (Supp. 1983); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 146.71 (West Supp. 1983); Wyo.
STAT. § 35-19-101 (Supp. 1983).
The statutory definitions of death attempt to retain the traditional standards of absence of
respiration and circulation for diagnosing death, while also adding the standard of brain death.
Horan, Definition of Death: An Emerging Consensus, 16 TRIAL 22, 23 (1980). The various
statutes fall into three categories. A. MORACZEWSKI & J. SHOWALTER, DETERMINATION OF DEATH
24 (1982); cf. Horan, supra, at 23 (occasionally the statutes are divided into four categories,
with the first of the three categories subdivided into two different categories). The first category
of statutes provides for alternative definitions of death, one based upon the traditional concept
of death as cessation of respiration and circulation, and the other based upon the modern
concept of brain death. Under this type of statute, death legally occurs if either definition
is met. The second category of statutes provides for determination of death based upon brain
function only if artificial means of life support prevent determination of death by traditional
means. The third category defines death based upon brain function, but does so without men-
tion of the traditional criteria for the determination of death. Although there is no provision
made for determination of death based upon the traditional criteria of cessation of respiration
and circulation, such a provision is implied. It was not intended that the traditional means
of death should be superceded by the statute. Horan, supra, at 23-24.
24. See State v. Fierro, 124 Ariz. 182, 603 P.2d 74 (1979) (victim was legally dead as a
result of gunshot wound to head prior to removal of life support systems); Swafford v. State,
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cent2" and was initiated as a form of protection for transplant surgeons.2" Surgeons
feared the possibility of criminal or civil liability for removing organs from
a body which, though medically dead, was maintained on artificial life sup-
port systems and therefore remained legally alive.27
After tracing the evolution of case law on the subject of brain death, it
immediately becomes apparent that there are few cases which attempt to
define death.2" The early case law centered on civil issues such as survivor-
ship and inheritance.29 The primary issue facing the courts in these early
cases was a determination of which of two people had survived the other
for purposes of inheritance. These cases were decided prior to the general
acceptance of brain death by the medical profession. As a result, the courts
declared that as a matter of law, death was to be defined as cessation of
respiration and circulation.3
In the late 1960's, case law was in a state of flux regarding the acceptance
of the concept of brain death. During this period of time, decisions could
be found which continued to adhere to the traditional definition of death. 31
n__ Id. __, 421 N.E.2d 596 (1981) (defendant guilty of murder when gunshot wound to
head caused irreversible cessation of all brain activity); Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass.
249, 366 N.E.2d 744 (1977) (defendant guilty of murder when he caused brain death by hitting
victim over the head with a baseball bat, despite removal of life support systems from victim
by physician), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978); State v. Meints, 212 Neb. 410, 322 N.W.2d
809 (1982) (defendant guilty of motor vehicle homicide when rear-end collision caused injury
to brain stem from which victim would not recover); New York City Health and Hosps. Corp.
v. Sulsona, 81 Misc. 2d 1002, 367 N.Y.S.2d 686 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (for purposes of anatomical
gifts under Public Health Law, death is to be defined in a way that is consistent with generally
accepted medical standard of brain death); In re Welfare of Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407, 617
P.2d 731 (1980) (abused child declared legally dead when all brain function had ceased).
25. The initial legal acceptance of brain death occurred in 1970 when Kansas adopted the
first statutory definition of death. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1982).
26. See, e.g., Taylor, A Statutory Definition of Death in Kansas, 215 J. A.M.A. 296, 296
(1971) (letter to the editor) (principal draftsman of the statute stated that the purpose of the
statute was protection from liability). See generally Capron & Kass, supra note 7, at 88 (statutory
definitions of death were prompted by members of medical profession who feared potential
liability for transplants); Comment, Liability and the Heart Transplant, 6 Hous. L. REV. 85,
97-104 (1968) (discrepancy between legal and medical definitions of death caused uncertainty
as to the potential civil and criminal liability of transplant surgeons).
27. Jacobson, Anderson & Speigel, supra note 10, at 701.
28. Friloux, Death, When Does it Occur?, in DEATH, DYING AND EUTHANASIA 27, 29 (D.
Horan & D. Mall eds. 1977).
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 579, 589, 317 S.W.2d 275, 281 (1958) (judicial
notice taken that one breathing, but unconscious, is not dead); Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal.
App. 2d 371, 376, 215 P.2d 478, 481 (1950) (applies Black's Law Dictionary definition of death
as cessation of respiration and pulsation); Gugel's Adm'r v. Orth's Ex'r, 314 Ky. 591, 594,
236 S.W.2d 460, 462 (1950) (decapitated wife held to have survived her husband because spurts
of blood continued to come from the body).
31. See, e.g., Estate of Schmidt, 261 Cal. App. 2d 262, 67 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1968). Schmidt
was a case involving a determination of heirship under the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 296-296.8 (West 1981). At issue was whether a husband and wife had
died simultaneously or whether one had predeceased the other. The petitioner had alleged that
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There also were cases, however, which accepted the newly introduced con-
cept of brain death.32 This inconsistency illustrates that both the medical
and legal communities were still uncertain as to what constituted death. 3
When the concept of brain death gained virtually universal acceptance in
the medical profession, 4 courts began to embrace brain death enthusiastically
as a legal determination of death. Consistent judicial acceptance has occurred
since the mid-1970's.35 As a result of Haymer, Illinois now joins the majority
of states by accepting this alternative definition for the legal determination
of death.
Judicial v. Legislative Action in Changing the Common Law
Controversy frequently ensues over which governmental branch holds the
authority to change the standing common law.36 The general rule is that
the trial court erred in its use of the common law definition of death to determine the question
of survivorship. Nevertheless, the trial court's conclusion that the husband had predeceased
the wife (who had died of a head injury) by 10 to 15 minutes was affirmed by the appellate
court. In affirming, the appellate court quoted the trial court:
Medical opinion in this case varied as to when death occurred. In the opinion of
the medical experts death might be the inability to resuscitate or an irreversible
coma. However, for purposes of this decision, this court considers death as defined
in Black's Dictionary, Third Edition: "as total stoppage of the circulation of the
blood and cessation of the animal and vital functions of the body such as respira-
tion and pulsation."
261 Cal. App. 2d at 273, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 854. The appellate court noted that although the peti-
tioner's contention was interesting, the above definition of death was to be used by the California
courts. Id.
32. See, e.g., United Trust Co. v. Pyke, 199 Kan. 1, 427 P.2d 67 (1967); Tucker v. Lower,
No. 2831 (Richmond, Va. L. & Eq. Ct., May 23, 1972) (cited in ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH
AND DYING 125 (R. Weir ed. 1977)). Brain death was readily accepted by the courts in Pyke
and Tucker; cf. Schmidt, 261 Cal. App. 2d 262, 67 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1968). In Pyke, a husband
fired five gun shots into the head of his wife and then turned the gun upon himself. Testimony
showed that while the wife bled profusely, the husband showed no signs of bleeding at all.
The court held that the wife had died before the husband, despite the circulating blood. 199
Kan. at 8, 427 P.2d at 73. This was based upon medical testimony that the severe brain damage
to the wife had caused an irreversible cessation of all brain function. Id.
In Tucker, a patient who had suffered severe head injuries was removed from a mechanical
respirator and pronounced dead. His heart was then removed by surgeons for use in an organ
transplant. The patient's brother sued the surgeons, claiming that his brother was alive at the
time the heart was removed. The judge instructed the jury that death could be determined
by either traditional or brain criteria. The jury found for the surgeons. No. 2831 (Richmond,
Va. L. & Eq. Ct., May 23, 1972). For discussion of Tucker, see CRITERIA FOR THE DETERMINA-
TION OF DEATH, supra note 18, at 21.
33. See Friloux, supra note 28, at 33.
34. Swafford v. State, - Ind. . , 421 N.E.2d 596, 598 (1981).
35. See supra note 24 and infra text accompanying note 56. Colorado also judicially ac-
cepted brain death. See Lovato v. District Court, 198 Colo. 419, 601 P.2d 1072 (1979). This
judicial decision was followed by a statutory definition of death. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-136
(Supp. 1982).
36. The common law of Illinois is not static. It has established itself in the history of the
law because of its flexibility in its recognition of and adaption to changing times and mores.
See, e.g., Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 11. 2d 74, 81, 117 N.E.2d 74, 79 (1954) (common law
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the common law is to remain in effect until expressly revoked by statute.3"
There are some situations, however, in which the common law is inadequate
in light of current circumstances. In such situations, the inaction of both
the legislature and the judiciary results in a virtual standstill in the law."
The Illinois Supreme Court has attempted to resolve such standstills by dic-
tating that the legislature and the courts should cooperate and assist each
other in examining and changing the common law to conform with the ever-
changing demands of the community.39 When a state of mutual inaction
exists, and a case comes before the court in which a gap in the common
law must be bridged, it is the imperative duty of the judiciary to act to
prevent a manifest injustice to the public.'"
THE HA YMER DECISION
Facts and Procedural History
On October 28, 1982, Loyola University Medical Center, owner and
operator of Foster G. McGaw Hospital, sought a declaratory judgment that
its seven-month-old patient, Alex B. Haymer, was dead. 1 The hospital sought
permission to remove the child from a mechanical ventilation system. 2 The
parents, however, as well as the child's guardian ad litem, opposed the
removal of the life support systems. 3 Uncontradicted expert medical testimony
by a pediatric neurosurgeon indicated that according to the usual and
customary standards of medical practice, Alex B. Haymer had suffered total
and irreversible brain death on October 23, 1982."
An order was issued to Foster G. McGaw Hospital to discontinue the
rule requiring foreseeability of injury was changed by court's holding that any violation of
the Uniform Traffic Act is negligence per se because the increase in population and number
of cars necessitated such a change); Amann v. Faidy, 415 Il. 422, 434, 114 N.E.2d 412, 418
(1953) (common law rule disallowing tort recovery by unborn children changed to allow recovery
because the rule was deemed antiquated). As adopted by our legislature, the common law is
a system of elementary rules and general judicial declarations that should expand simultaneously
with the process of society. Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74, 81, 117 N.E.2d 74, 79 (1954);
Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 434, 114 N.E.2d 412, 418 (1953).
37. ILL. RE. STAT. ch. 1, § 801 (West Supp. 1983). "The common law of England, so
far as the same is applicable and of a general nature, and all statutes or acts of the British
Parliament ...shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered as of full force until
repealed by legislative authority." Id.
38. Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 23, 421 N.E.2d 886, 896 (1981) (comparative negligence
adopted judicially).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 115 111. App. 3d at 350, 450 N.E.2d at 942.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 356, 450 N.E.2d at 946. Dr. Timothy B. Scarff testified that the child exhibited
lack of responsiveness, including brain stem reflexes, lack of pupillary or other eye movements,
lack of spontaneous eye movements, lack of spontaneous respiration, lack of brain activity
evidenced by a flat electroencephalogram, and a negative isotope blood flow. All of the above
tests indicate irreversible brain death.
1983]
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mechanical ventilation system."5 The trial court stayed the effect of its order
for seven days to provide for appellate review before the mechanical
ventilation system was removed." Because the circumstances surrounding the
brain injury of Alex B. Haymer were suspicious,47 the state of Illinois was
allowed to intervene on the grounds that it had an interest in any death
caused by criminal action in the state. The state objected to the stay because
after brain death has occurred and artificial maintenance on a respirator
continues, tissue deterioration occurs "which may render it impossible to
determine the cause of death." 48 The appellate court nevertheless stayed the
effect of the trial court's order and set oral arguments for December 6, 1982."9
Meanwhile, on November 28, 1982, Alex B. Haymer's heart stopped beating
and the mechanical ventilation system was removed.5"
The Court's Holding and Rationale
Despite the fact that Alex B. Haymer's heart stopped functioning, thereby
satisfying the traditional legal definition of death, the appellate court reviewed
the case and affirmed the lower court's decision that the child was legally
dead on October 23, 1982, the date on which his brain ceased to function.5 '
The court held that "a person is legally dead if he or she has sustained
either (1) irreversible cessation of total brain function, according to usual
and customary standards of medical practice, or (2) irreversible cessation
of circulatory and respiratory functions, according to usual and customary
standards of medical practice." 52
In laying the foundation for its acceptance of brain death, the Haymer
court initially looked to the technological advancements that frequently make
the traditional definition of death meaningless. 3 The court emphasized that
in light of these technological advancements, the traditional definition of
death could no longer be accepted as accurate. 4 The court then looked to
the present state of the law regarding brain death and noted that the strong
majority of states now legally recognize brain death. 5 The Haymer court
emphasized that no court to which the issue has been presented has ever
rejected brain death as a legal definition of death. 6
45. Id. at 350, 450 N.E.2d at 942.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (quoting Affidavit of Cook County Medical Examiner).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 355, 450 N.E.2d at 945.
53. Id. at 350, 450 N.E.2d at 942. The court specifically mentioned cardiopulmonary bypass
machines, heart transplants, artificial hearts, and mechanical respirators.
54. Id. at 351, 450 N.E.2d at 942. The court quoted a neurosurgeon as saying that "the
time honored criteria of stoppage of the heartbeat and circulation are indicative of death only
when they persist long enough for the brain to die." Id.
55. Id. at 352, 450 N.E.2d at 943.
56. Id. (quoting A. MORACZEWSIc & J. SHOWALTER, supra note 23, at 30). The Haymer
[Vol. 33:207
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Alex B. Haymer's guardian ad litem had contended that if brain death
were to be accepted as a legal definition of death, it should be done by
the legislature and not the judiciary." The Haymer court reasoned that based
upon supreme court precedent, 8 that the judiciary has an affirmative duty
to reform the law when appropriate legislation is nonexistent.59 Given the
need to have a medically accurate legal definition of death, and given the
General Assembly's failure to adopt brain death as a legal definition, the
court determined that it was "appropriate and proper" for the judiciary
to bridge this gap in the common law." °
Because the child's heart stopped functioning prior to appellate review,
the case technically could have been declared moot." Invoking an excep-
court relied upon this proposition, but it does not appear to be entirely true. Brain death as
a definition of death was discussed in Estate of Schmidt, 261 Cal. App. 2d 262, 273, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 847, 854 (1968). See supra note 31 and accompanying text. The trial court, as a question
of fact, decided that the correct criteria for the determination of death were cessation of respira-
tion and circulation, not cessation of brain function. The appellate court held that the trial
court's factual determination was not to be altered, absent any abuse of discretion. While it
does appear that this is a case in which brain death was rejected, this oversight is not fatal
to the Haymer court's reasoning. The California court's decision was handed down in April
1968-at least four months prior to the publication of the Harvard Report, the first widely
publicized recognition of brain death by the medical community. See supra notes 8-9. The
concept of brain death was still too radical and controversial for the Schmidt court to accept.
Today, however, brain death is becoming the accepted norm.
57. Brief for Appellant at 6, In re Haymer, 115 II1. App. 3d 349, 450 N.E.2d 940 (1983).
58. 115 I11. App. 3d at 353, 450 N.E.2d at 944 (citing Alvis v. Ribar, 85 I11. 2d 1, 421
N.E.2d 886 (1981)).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. The general rule is that a question is moot when it presents or involves no actual con-
troversy, interest, or right of the parties, or when the issues have ceased to exist. See, e.g.,
People v. Redlich, 402 I11. 270, 278, 83 N.E.2d 736, 741 (1949) (contempt of court order not
moot because defendant would be confined to jail until he complied with an order that no
longer existed); Berg v. City of Chicago, 97 II1. App. 2d 410, 420, 240 N.E.2d 344, 349 (1st
Dist. 1968) (when suit for violation of traffic ordinance was dismissed, whatever controversy
existed as to the validity of the ordinance was rendered moot). When an appellate court has
notice of acts that show that only moot questions or mere abstract propositions are involved,
or when substantial questions before the trial court no longer exist, it will dismiss the appeal.
See, e.g., People v. Redlich, 402 I11. at 279, 83 N.E.2d at 741 (appeal not dismissed because
decision affected the disposition of a jail term defendant was serving); Tuttle v. Gunderson,
341 Il. 36, 45, 173 N.E. 175, 178 (1930) (appeal against trustees dismissed because trust had
already been distributed). Following these general rules, the Haymer case was technically moot
because the central question of whether Alex B. Haymer was legally dead was resolved when
his heart stopped functioning on November 28, 1982. According to the traditional common
law definition of death, Alex B. Haymer was undeniably dead.
Illinois, however, recognizes exceptions to these general mootness rules. An appellate court
is not required to dismiss a case even though the issue is technically moot if the issue is likely
to recur and involves matters of public concern, particularly in a situation in which the stan-
dard time for disposition of the appeal would effectively deprive similarly situated plaintiffs
of appellate review. See, e.g., In re Estate of Brooks, 32 111. 2d 361, 364, 205 N.E.2d 435,
437 (1965) (decision regarding the constitutionality of appointment of a conservator for pur-
pose of administering blood to a ward was of sufficient public interest not to be dismissed
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tion, however, the Haymer court classified the case as one capable of repeti-
tion yet evading judicial review. 2 Thus, the Haymer court dismissed the
allegations of mootness and went on to the merits of the case, adopting
brain death as a legal definition of death in Illinois.
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
The Haymer court concluded correctly that the common law definition
of death63 is no longer meaningful or accurate." Modern technology allows
medical personnel to intervene in the process of dying at various stages."
For example, as the Haymer decision explained, people in today's society
continue to live after experiencing cardiac arrest.6 6 Similarly, cardiopulmonary
bypass machines permit a patient's heart to be stopped for several hours
during cardiac surgery with full clinical recovery after resuscitation. 67 Despite
medical intervention, however, in less successful situations deterioration occurs
with a progression to the point of irreversible brain death. Even after this
point is reached, cardiac pacemakers and artificial respiratory maintenance
make it possible to maintain mechanically the vital functions ordinarily con-
trolled by the brain stem. Consequently, the traditional criteria of death are
rendered useless in determining when death occurs in these patients. New
parameters are clearly needed to determine when death has occurred.
The status of modern technology as the underlying impetus for an altera-
tion in the legal definition of death is well documented in case law. Since
1975, every case in which brain death has been judicially recognized has
made specific reference to medical advancements as the causal factor.
68
Furthermore, each of these cases has involved a victim who was maintained
on artificial life support systems.6 9 The continual reappearance of life sup-
for mootness after the transfusion was given); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973)
(condition of pregnancy classified as capable of repetition, yet evading review). Based upon
these recognized exceptions, the Haymer court correctly concluded that the case fell within
the category of those cases which consistently tend to escape judicial review.
62. 115 II1. App. 3d at 357, 450 N.E.2d at 946.
63. See supra note 1.
64. 115 111. App. 3d at 351, 450 N.E.2d at 942.
65. See CRITERIA FOR THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH, supra note 18, at 13.
66. 115 111. App. 3d at 351, 450 N.E.2d at 942.
67. Id.
68. See State v. Fierro, 124 Ariz. 182, 185, 603 P.2d 74, 77 (1979) (transplants as impetus);
Lovato v. District Court, 198 Colo. 419, 425, 601 P.2d 1072, 1076 (1979) (resuscitative technology
and transplants); Swafford v. State, - Ind. -, -, 421 N.E.2d 596, 598 (1981) (mechanical
maintenance of heartbeat and respiration); Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 254,
366 N.E.2d 744, 749 (artificial life support), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978); State v. Meints,
212 Neb. 410, 415, 322 N.W.2d 809, 812 (1982) (artificial maintenance of bodily functions);
New York City Health and Hosps. Corp. v. Sulsona, 81 Misc. 2d 1002, 1004, 367 N.Y.S.2d
686, 688 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (transplants and mechanical means to support circulatory and
respiratory functions); In re Welfare of Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407, 412, 617 P.2d 731, 736
(1980) (resuscitation after cardiac arrest).
69. For example, in New York City Health and Hosps. Corp. v. Sulsona, 81 Misc. 2d
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port systems as the factor creating the controversy in these cases illustrates
clearly that the use of such modern medical technology necessitates a legal
determination of what constitutes death. Because these life support systems
artificially control respiration and circulation, the only accurate indication
of death in these situations is brain death. Thus, it is imperative that brain
death be accepted as a legal definition of death.
The medical profession has long recognized the need for a new definition
of death and, in 1968, established the first widely accepted set of criteria
for the determination of brain death.7" According to present standards, the
general common law definition of death is no longer acceptable. As a case
of first impression in Illinois, Haymer provided the judiciary with a prime
opportunity for the very important resolution of the definitional dilemma
regarding brain death in Illinois.
1002, 367 N.Y.S.2d 686 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975), the controversy surrounded the removal of organs
for transplant from a neurologically dead patient who was maintained on life support systems.
Although the patient's family consented to removal of his kidneys for transplant purposes,
the physicians involved feared liability for removing the organs from a patient who was not
legally dead. Id. at 1005, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 689. To avoid liability for removing the kidneys
prior to the cessation of respiration and circulation, the physicians sought a declaratory judg-
ment on the meaning of death.
In a somewhat different fashion, the use of life support systems underlay the controversies
in State v. Fierro, 124 Ariz. 182, 603 P.2d 74 (1979); Swafford v. State, - Ind. -, 421
N.E.2d 596 (1981); Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 366 N.E.2d 744 (1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978); and State v. Meints, 212 Neb. 410, 322 N.W.2d 809 (1982).
These were criminal homicide cases in which the convicted defendants unsuccessfully alleged
that the removal of life support systems from neurologically dead victims, rather than the defen-
dants' actions, was the proximate cause of the homicides. In both Fierro and Swafford, the
defendants unsuccessfully appealed their convictions for shooting the victims in the head. Although
life support systems sustained the victim's biological functions for a period of time, the victims
were eventually pronounced neurologically dead and all life support systems were removed.
See Fierro, 124 Ariz. at 184, 603 P.2d at 76; Swafford, - Ind. at -, 421 N.E.2d at
597. In Golston, the victim was hit on the head with a baseball bat by the defendant. As
in Swafford and Fierro, brain death resulted and mechanical life support systems were conse-
quently removed. The defendant unsuccessfully claimed that a jury instruction on brain death
was inappropriate. See Golston, 373 Mass. at 253, 366 N.E.2d at 748. In Meints, the defendant
was convicted of motor vehicle homicide after the victim died of a fatal brain injury. The
defendant argued that pulling the plug on the respirator was a superceding cause of death.
The conviction was upheld. See Meints, 212 Neb. at 420-21, 322 N.W.2d at 814-15.
Consistent with the above cases, the use of life support systems created the controversy in
the most recent of the brain death cases-Lovato v. District Court, 198 Colo. 419, 601 P.2d
1072 (1979), and In re Welfare of Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407, 617 P.2d 731 (1980). These
cases bear a striking resemblance to Haymer in the respect that each of them sought to define
death so that life support systems could be removed from a neurologically dead child. In both
Lovato and Bowman, an abused child was declared neurologically dead. In Lovato, a court
order was issued to permit the hospital to remove the life support systems. The mother of
the child appealed the order unsuccessfully, claiming that the court had abused its discretion
by legally recognizing brain death. In Bowman, the child's heart stopped prior to review of
the trial court's determination that the child was legally dead. Nonetheless, the supreme court
affirmed the decision.
70. See A Definition of Irreversible Coma, supra note 8, at 337; see also supra note 9
and infra note 81.
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The Haymer court devoted a great deal of discussion to the issue of whether
the judiciary can appropriately establish a legal definition of death or whether
such judicial action is a usurpation of legislative power." Proponents of
a statutory approach could argue that action by the judiciary would result
in retrospective judicial lawmaking and would constitute an invasion of
legislative territory. 2 This judicial versus legislative debate has been addressed
in several of the other brain death cases.' 3 Accordingly, the Haymer court
relied upon the reasoning of these decisions, specifically quoting from
Lovato.'4 The Haymer court correctly concluded that the absence of legislative
action in this matter does not preclude judicial action. The court followed
the Illinois Supreme Court's dictate that the judiciary act when circumstances
are presented that call for a change in the common law.' 5 Such a change
in the legal definition of death is necessary if the common law is to expand
with the progress of society.
Furthermore, in many circumstances judicial action is proper because a
judge has no way of knowing if legislative action will ever occur. If a court
does act in a manner that the legislature finds inappropriate, the mistake
can later be rectified by statute., Because of the urgent need for a legal
determination of death in Haymer, as well as the general need for revision
of the definition of death in Illinois, the Haymer court clearly acted within
its authority when accepting brain death as a legal definition of death.
In formulating its judicial definition of death, the Haymer court recognized
and acknowledged the General Assembly's intent to adopt brain death as
a legal definition of death in another context." The court voluntarily took
into consideration the Illinois General Assembly's intent, found in the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act,'" which defines death as irreversible cessa-
tion of total brain function. Although the Act did not control the issues
in Haymer, the court found it significant that the legislature's definition of
death under the Act conformed with the "consensus of the medical com-
munity that brain death is the death of the person."' 9 Legislative intent is
usually considered by courts only when interpreting a specific statute. 0 Con-
71. 115 I11. App. 2d at 353, 450 N.E.2d at 944.
72. See infra note 73; see also Comment, Medical and Legal Views, supra note 1, at 182.
73. See Lovato v. District Court, 198 Colo. 419, 425, 601 P.2d 1072, 1075 (1979) (defen-
dant contended that the trial judge had changed the law and invaded the province of the
legislature); Swafford v. State, - Ind. - , -, 421 N.E.2d 596, 600 (1981) (defendant
claimed brain death definition was a legislative matter); Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass.
249, 253, 366 N.E.2d 744, 748 (1977) (defendant claimed that ex post facto lawmaking had
occurred), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978).
74. 115 I11. App. 3d at 353, 450 N.E.2d 944 (quoting Lovato v. District Court, 198 Colo.
419, 428, 601 P.2d 1072, 1081 (1979)).
75. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
76. Capron & Kass, supra note 7, at 101.
77. 115 111. App. 3d at 354, 450 N.E.2d at 945.
78. ILL. REa. STAT. ch. 110V, § 302(b) (1981).
79. 115 I1. App. 3d at 353, 450 N.E.2d at 945.
80. See Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hosp., 46 Ill. 2d 32, 39, 262 N.E.2d 450, 454 (1970)
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sideration of legislative intent, therefore, indicates a commendable effort on
the part of the court to act harmoniously with the legislature and to avoid
usurpation of legislative functions.
While the decision of the Haymer court to define death legally should
be applauded, the definition does have some inherent weaknesses. In light
of the various criteria that have been developed to diagnose brain death,8 '
it appears that the Haymer definition is somewhat vague and nonspecific.82
(legislative intent regarding statute of limitations on malpractice actions considered); Morgan
v. Board of Educ., Trico Community Unit School Dist., 22 Il1. App. 3d 241, 246, 317 N.E.2d
393, 397 (1974) (legislature's intent in drafting statutory school code considered in interpreta-
tion of the code).
81. The following are examples of the various criteria for the determination of brain death:
(A) The Harvard Criteria:
1) Unreceptivity and unresponsitivity. There is a total unawareness to externally
applied stimuli. Even the most intensely painful stimuli evoke no vocal or other
response.
2) No movements or breathing. Observation covering a period of at least one
hour by physicians is adequate. After the patient is on a mechanical respirator,
the total absence of spontaneous breathing may be established by turning off the
respirator for three minutes and observing whether there is any effort on the part
of the subject to breathe spontaneously.
3) No reflexes. Irreversible coma with abolition of central nervous system activ-
ity is evidenced in part by the absence of elicitable reflexes.
4) Flat electroencephalogram. At least ten full minutes of recording are desirable,
but twice that would be better.
A Definition of Irreversible Coma, supra note 8, at 337-38. Contra Diagnosis of Death in
Comatose Patients Under Resuscitation Treatment: A Critical Review of the Harvard Report,
2 AM. J.L. & MED. I (1976) (disputing the use of clinical criteria for the determination of
death, advocating angiography instead) [hereinafter cited as Diagnosis of Death].
(B) American EEG Society Criteria:
1) No spontaneous respiration for a minimum of 60 minutes.
2) No reflex response. No change in heart rate on ocular or carotid sinus pressure.
3) EEG. Flat lines with no rhythms in any leads for at least 60 minutes of con-
tinuous recording. No EEG response to auditory or somatic stimuli or to electrical
stimulation. Two longer periods of total flat recording some hours apart may be
preferred by some.
4) Normal basic laboratory data including electrolyte pattern.
5) Share responsibility for pronouncement of death with other colleagues.
Hamlin, Life or Death by EEG, 190 J. A.M.A. 112, 114 (1964).
(C) BRAIN Criteria:
1) Brain stem areflexia. Absent corneal, pupillary, ciliospinal, oculocephalic,
oculovestibular, tonic neck reflexes.
2) Radionuclide angiography. Documentation of the absence of cerebral circula-
tion is mandated as a confirmatory test of brain death.
3) Apnea. Observation by a physician covering a period of at least one hour
is adequate to satisfy the criteria of no spontaneous respiration.
4) Isoelectric EEG. There is good evidence that a technically adequate EEG that
is isoelectric for 10 to 30 minutes signifies severe brain damage.
5) Negative results at 24 hour repeat of the above tests.
Hoffman & Van Cura, Death-The Five Brain Criteria, MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 377, 395 (1978).
82. Compare Swafford v. State, __ Ind. ., , 421 N.E.2d 596, 602 (1981) (brain
death defined as the irreversible cessation of total brain function as determined by accepted
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The definition leaves the diagnosis of cessation of brain function up to the
"usual and customary standards of medical practice." 3 There are no specific
guidelines as to how to diagnose brain death, nor are there any specific details
such as the number of physicians to be involved in the determination.
Although the Haymer court's determination of the legal definition of death
was appropriate, it was not sufficient to solve all future questions regarding
brain death. Rather, action by the legislature should be taken to fill in the
gaps left open by the Haymer court's definition of brain death. The
advantages and disadvantages of legislative solutions over judicial resolu-
tions have long been the subject of debate. At the forefront of the debate
is the argument that reliance upon the judiciary for promulgation of the
legal definition of death does not actively involve the public in the decision-
making process."' Death is a medical, legal, theological, and philosophical
concept and, as such, any attempt to define it should include the input of
the various disciplines. 5 Not only should the scientific and legal dimensions
of death be considered; rather, those dimensions of death that make it such
an emotional subject should be given equal consideration. Only at open and
publicized legislative hearings can the testimony and discussion of theologians,
lawyers, sociologists, physicians, philosophers, and representatives of other
various viewpoints be considered before framing a legal definition of death. 6
Also of paramount importance is the fact that a judicial definition of death
is limited to the specific jurisdiction and subject matter of the litigation.
The Haymer decision, for example, has precedential value only in the First
District8" because it is an appellate court decision. 8 A legislative definition,
on the other hand, would not be limited in either jurisdiction or scope.
The legislative approach, however, also has some drawbacks. Some com-
mentators believe that a statutory definition of death would consist of overly
rigid guidelines for tho, determination of brain death. 9 Consequently, a statute
could be subject to quick obsolescence as future refinements and developments
in medical technology occur. While this certainly is a consideration, none
of the statutes thus far enacted has imposed the rigidity that many advocates
of the judicial approach feared."' Moreover, medical technology in this area
seems to have progressed as far as possible. Therefore, a statutory defini-
medical standards) with State v. Fierro, 124 Ariz. 182, 186, 603 P.2d 74, 77 (1979) (brain
death defined as total cessation of brain function as determined by the Harvard Criteria).
83. 115 111. App. 3d at 355, 450 N.E.2d at 945.
84. See Capron & Kass, supra note 7, at 100.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
88. Similarly, the Golston decision is technically limited to the law of homicide by a specific
notation of the court that it was not concerned with the countless other situations in which
a definition of death might be needed. 373 Mass. 249, 255, 366 N.E.2d 744, 749 (1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978).
89. See Hirsh, supra note 2, at 386.
90. See Comment, Medical and Legal Views, supra note 1, at 187.
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tion of death that incorporates medical criteria would not be obsolete in
the foreseeable future.
On balance, it appears that legislative enactment of a statutory definition
of death is the preferred alternative. 9' A legislative definition would permit
public participation in the decision-making process and contain the clarity
and specificity necessary to dispel the fears of both the public and physi-
cians. The need for preciseness, accuracy, flexibility, and public involvement
would thus be met. 9 Perhaps most importantly, a legislative definition would
provide for a state-wide definition of death applicable to all circumstances.
Although the Haymer court did not specifically encourage such legislative
action to be taken in Illinois, it did appear to recognize that such an option
exists.93 The Haymer decision provides Illinois with the much needed
framework for a legal definition of death based upon brain death. The
legislature, aided by the input of many disciplines, should now build upon
that framework by establishing a comprehensive statutory definition of death.
IMPACT
The general definition of brain death adopted by the Haymer court has
implications beyond pointing up the need for legislative action. Lack of
criteria upon which to predicate the occurrence of brain death could foster
uncertainty among the medical profession as to what constitutes an accep-
table determination of brain death.94 This, in turn, could result in incon-
sistency among physicians in diagnosing brain death.95 It is foreseeable that
one physician would consider a patient to be dead while another would con-
sider a patient in a similar condition to be alive. This could conceivably
result in disparate treatment of two identical patients with regard to issues
such as deciding whether to terminate life support systems.
Notwithstanding the judicial nature of the definition, and therefore its in-
herent limitations, the Haymer court's recognition of brain death will have
far-reaching implications in Illinois. Perhaps the greatest impact96 will be
91. See Capron & Kass, supra note 7, at 101 (preferring legislative over judicial definition).
But see Note, The Time of Death, supra note 4, at 256 (preferring judicial over legislative
definition).
92. See Capron & Kass, supra note 7, at 101.
93. "We recognize the authority of, and indeed encourage, the General Assembly to pro-
nounce statutorily the standards by which death is to be determined .. " 115 Ill. App. 3d
at 353, 450 N.E.2d at 944 (quoting Lovato v. District Court, 198 Colo. 419, 428, 601 P.2d
1072, 1081 (1979)). The Colorado legislature did subsequently adopt a statutory definition of
death. See supra note 35.
94. See Hirsh, supra note 2, at 386.
95. See Capron & Kass, supra note 7, at 97.
96. Perhaps were it not for Illinois' prior adoption of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act,
the largest effect of the Haymer decision would have been felt in the area of transplants. Because
the Act already defines death, for the purpose of the statute, as irreversible cessation of total
brain function, there has been no concern over liability for the removal of organs from
neurologically dead patients.
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felt by patients who are maintained on artificial life support systems and
the families of those patients. Prior to the Haymer decision, physicians had
no legal authority to declare a patient neurologically dead and discontinue
life support systems. A physician's discretion was limited because the
possibility of civil or criminal liability was a realistic fear.97 Disregarding
the purpose behind the physician's actions, the law could have equated "pull-
ing the plug" with criminal homicide by a hired gunman;" both actions
result in death, and in both situations the actor intends that death should
follow. The Haymer decision, however, allows physicians to remove life sup-
port systems legally from those patients diagnosed as neurologically dead.
The decision to remove such systems does not rest solely in the hands of
the physicians, but it rests on society as well through its acceptance of brain
death as a legal definition of death. 9 Although the societal input is not as
great as it would be if a legislative definition were formulated, judicial pro-
mulgation of what constitutes death nonetheless takes the bulk of the deci-
sion making out of the physician's hands. The physician will be making the
ultimate decision, however, that decision will be guided by a legal standard.
The extent of the impact of Haymer upon artificially sustained patients is
further illustrated by recognition that all of the modern brain death deci-
sions have involved victims on mechanical life support systems.' 9
Beyond easing the physician's fear of liability for removing life support
systems, the impact of Haymer will be felt by the families of such patients
and by the hospitals.'"' The prolonged mental suffering and financial strain
experienced by the family will be lessened by a timely determination of brain
death and the resulting termination of artificial maintenance of a family
member.' 2 Additionally, hospital beds will be freed and staff and resources
made available to patients who are capable of recovering.' 3
Another major area where the impact of the Haymer decision will be felt
is in the area of criminal law. Declaring a patient neurologically dead prior
to the occurrence of clinical death aids in the determination of criminal
wrongdoing as well as the determination of the specific cause of an injury.
Prior to Haymer, a legal pronouncement of death might take place minutes
97. See Fletcher, Prolonging Life, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYING 226 (R. Weir
ed. 1977).
98. Id.
99. See Appel, Ethical and Legal Questions Posed by Advances in Medicine, 205 J. A.M.A.
513, 516 (1968).
100. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
101. See Diagnosis of Death, supra note 81, at 4.
102. Id.
103. Id. The amount of time that a patient can be artificially maintained after brain death
occurs varies. Reported cases illustrate a period of at least 43 to 74 days. These patients might
have been sustained even longer, but court orders ended their ordeals by allowing life support
systems to be terminated. See Paris & Cranford, Brain Death, Prolife and Catholic Confusion,
AMERICA 345, 346, 349 (December 4, 1982).
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or days after the occurrence of brain death. Brain tissue is extremely sen-
sitive to post-mortem changes, and deterioration of the tissue prior to autopsy
can mask the true cause of death.' 4 Now that a timely legal pronouncement
of death can be made, such difficulties can be avoided.
Lastly, Haymer will have an impact on the numerous legal issues that
require a determination of the time and presence of death. Such issues in-
clude questions of inheritance,' 5 liability under life insurance contracts,'1
6
and obligations incurred contractually by the deceased.' 7 A precise deter-
mination of death is always useful, but frequently is indispensable in these
situations."'8 Prior to Haymer, a person was not legally dead when
neurologically dead; however, in the future, a legally acceptable determina-
tion of brain death may lead to a different disposition of personal and real
property as well as insurance benefits. The Haymer designation of brain death
as legal death thus serves to provide for a more accurate disposition of these
legal matters.
CONCLUSION
The Haymer court's acceptance of brain death as a legal definition pro-
vides the legal community with a modern definition of death long recognized
by the medical community. The development of surgical transplants, car-
diopulmonary resuscitation, and artificial life support systems has rendered
the traditional definition of death-cessation of respiration and circulation-
meaningless in many situations. Haymer provided a prime opportunity for
the appellate court to acknowledge this definitional dilemma and rectify the
situation accordingly.
While the Haymer court appropriately fulfilled the need for a legal defini-
tion by recognizing brain death judicially, it is now imperative that the
legislature act. Adoption of a death statute would clarify the concept of
brain death and provide a consistent, state-wide definition. Therefore, it is
suggested that the Illinois legislature enact a statutory definition of death.
Marilee Clausing
104. See Hirsh, supra note 2, at 390; Sweet, Brain Death, 299 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 410
(1978). The vulnerability of central neural tissue is well known. Neurotransmitters such as
norepinephrine, dopamine, and serotonin lose their in vivo characteristic chemical affinities
so rapidly that they cannot be detected more than one hour after brain death occurs. Hirsh,
supra note 2, at 390.
105. See CRITERIA FOR THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH, supra note 18, at 18.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. For example, consider a situation in which two people have willed in each other's
favor and they both die in the same accident. It is essential to know who died first so that
his property can be passed to the other and then distributed to the appropriate heirs. See In
re Estate of Rowley, 257 Cal. App. 2d 324, 339, 65 Cal. Rptr. 139, 143 (1968) (jury decided
that one spouse had survived the other by 1/500,000th of a second).
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